A Government Strong Against Armenians, Weak Before Armenia’s Enemies
04 October 2026
By Levon Baronian
Several developments in Armenia over the past week have once again exposed the disturbing reality of the state Nikol Pashinyan has built.
An armed Azerbaijani serviceman crossed into Armenia, traveled deep into Syunik, entered an Armenian family’s home in Shaki and opened fire, seriously injuring a woman and also injuring her children. Armenian authorities had already been informed that the Azerbaijani soldier was missing and may have crossed the border.
The most basic question is unavoidable: how was an armed Azerbaijani serviceman able to penetrate so far into Armenian territory and reach a civilian home?
The incident is especially troubling because Armenia has seen this before. In 2023, Azerbaijani servicemen crossed into Syunik, one of them later being convicted in connection with the killing of an Armenian civilian. Both were eventually returned to Azerbaijan as part of a prisoner exchange. Armenians therefore have every reason to demand that the Shaki attacker be prosecuted fully under Armenian law and not later transformed into another bargaining chip.
At the same time, the Armenian government demonstrates remarkable efficiency when dealing with its domestic political opponents.
Opposition activist Artur Ohanian, the Vanadzor representative of the Hayastan alliance and a candidate in the June parliamentary elections, was arrested in an electoral bribery case and ordered detained. Opposition parliamentarian Edgar Ghazaryan, meanwhile, received a suspended prison sentence over statements criticizing Constitutional Court judges, a conviction that may ultimately threaten his parliamentary mandate.
International election observers have already raised concerns about perceptions of selective law enforcement in Armenia, noting that criminal investigations involving alleged electoral violations disproportionately targeted the opposition.
No political figure should be above the law. But neither should the law become an instrument for suppressing political opposition.
That is what makes the contrast so striking. An armed Azerbaijani serviceman crosses Armenia’s border and reaches an Armenian family’s home. Yet when an Armenian opposition figure delivers a harsh speech, organizes politically or challenges the regime, the institutions of the state suddenly become vigilant, aggressive and effective.
This can not be rationalized simply as incompetence, weakness or the absence of a coherent national strategy.
The pattern is too consistent.
For years, Pashinyan has surrendered Armenian positions while presenting each retreat as another step toward peace. Artsakh was abandoned. Azerbaijan’s demands have repeatedly been accommodated. Armenian national symbols, historical positions and even elements of Armenia’s constitutional identity have been placed on the negotiating table. The Armenian government displays extraordinary restraint toward Baku and Ankara while increasingly treating Armenians who resist this course as enemies of the state.
That is why many Armenians have come to regard Pashinyan not simply as a failed leader, but as a political Trojan horse operating from within the Armenian state against Armenian national interests.
Whether one uses the word betrayal, capitulation or something even stronger, the result before us is unmistakable: those threatening Armenia from outside encounter concessions, while those resisting the destruction of Armenia’s national agenda from within encounter prosecutors, police and courts.
The same pattern is visible in foreign relations. Pashinyan now again calls for “constructive dialogue” with Russia as Armenia faces restrictions affecting exports and transit within the Eurasian Economic Union. Armenia absolutely must maintain relations with Russia, Europe, the United States, Iran and its other partners. But Armenia’s foreign policy must serve Armenia.
Under this regime, foreign policy has instead become part of a broader process of dismantling the foundations of Armenian national power while assuring Armenians that each new concession is unavoidable.
Meanwhile, the supposed peace produced by this policy looks increasingly hollow. After everything Armenia has surrendered, an armed Azerbaijani serviceman can still cross the border and reach an Armenian family’s home in Syunik.
The Armenian Revolutionary Federation has long argued for a fundamentally different course: strong national defense, balanced foreign relations, accountable institutions and policies based first and foremost on Armenian national interests.
The family in Shaki had every right to expect that an armed Azerbaijani soldier would be stopped before reaching their doorstep. Armenians have every right to expect their government to defend the border with at least the same determination it employs against its political opponents.
A government should direct the strength of the Armenian state against those who threaten Armenia, not against Armenians who refuse to remain silent.
What we are witnessing is not merely bad governance.
It is the systematic reversal of the Armenian state’s purpose.
