BY GEVORG GHUKASYAN

On May 26, during U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s brief visit to Armenia, Armenia and the United States initialled the Strategic Cooperation Framework Agreement on TRIPP, signed a Framework Memorandum on Securing Supply Chains for Critical Minerals and Rare Earth Extraction and Processing, and concluded the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Charter between the two countries.

The International Secretariat of ANC-International (Armenian National Committee) has conducted a comprehensive analysis of the Strategic Cooperation Framework Agreement on TRIPP (hereinafter referred to as the “Framework Agreement”). The agreement was signed by the U.S. Secretary of State on June 1 and by Armenia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs on June 4, just three days before Armenia’s parliamentary elections. Although neither party publicly linked the timing of the signing to Armenia’s electoral calendar, the completion of the process immediately before the elections effectively ensured that the agreement would be finalized before any potential change in the composition of the National Assembly or the formation of a new government. As a result, political debate surrounding TRIPP has effectively shifted to a different stage: the central issue is no longer whether the agreement should be signed, but rather its ratification, constitutional review, implementation, and related matters.

Following the completion of the domestic ratification procedures, the agreement will become part of the legal system of the Republic of Armenia. By virtue of its legal and political implications, the document seeks to establish an entirely new framework within and around Armenia as a direct consequence of the trilateral Armenia–Azerbaijan–United States understandings reached in 2025. At that time, TRIPP was presented as a regional infrastructure initiative based on connectivity and peace, designed to facilitate multimodal transit between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic through the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia, while simultaneously promoting regional stability, economic development, and broader integration into international trade.

The present analysis focuses primarily on the legal, constitutional, institutional, governance, economic, and sovereignty-related shortcomings and challenges embedded within the Framework Agreement itself. It does not address the geopolitical merits of the project; rather, its objective is to identify and assess the existing legal and institutional issues in order to make them manageable and subject to appropriate safeguards.

The purpose of this study is to assess the implications of the agreement from the perspectives of Armenia’s sovereignty, legal system, democratic accountability, economic autonomy, environmental governance, and long-term strategic flexibility.

The Framework Agreement thus marks the beginning of a new phase in regional connectivity and infrastructure cooperation. The project is presented as an initiative to promote peace, economic development, and regional integration by facilitating multimodal transit between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan via the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia, while also contributing to regional stability and expanding international trade.

However, a substantive examination of the agreement demonstrates that it carries far broader implications than those of a conventional transport or investment project. The document establishes long-term legal, economic, and governance mechanisms that could significantly affect Armenia’s sovereignty, public administration, economic policy, environmental oversight, and strategic autonomy.

At the core of the agreement is the establishment of the joint venture TRIPP Development Company (TDC). Under the proposed structure, 74 percent of TDC’s shares would be owned by TDC US, representing the American side, while Armenia would hold the remaining 26 percent. Although the agreement provides that Armenia’s stake could increase to 49 percent after 49 years, this option is contingent upon extending the project’s duration by an additional 50 years. Consequently, for the vast majority of the agreement’s lifespan, Armenia would remain a minority stakeholder in the entity responsible for developing and managing strategic infrastructure located on its own territory.

One of the principal concerns identified in the analysis relates to the agreement’s strategic asymmetry. The document provides practical and institutional mechanisms to realize Azerbaijan’s long-standing objective of securing uninterrupted connectivity between its mainland territory and Nakhichevan. This objective is embedded through specific infrastructure, governance, and legal arrangements. At the same time, Armenia does not receive equivalent, legally binding, or enforceable rights. The agreement does not guarantee Armenia transit access through Azerbaijan or Nakhichevan, does not require the restoration of regional railway links, and contains no legal mechanisms obligating Turkey and Azerbaijan to lift their decades-long blockade of Armenia. As a result, Azerbaijan’s objectives are translated into concrete institutional arrangements, while Armenia’s anticipated benefits remain largely confined to political declarations rather than legally enforceable commitments.

Although the agreement repeatedly reaffirms Armenia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and jurisdiction, its practical structure creates significant limitations on the exercise of that sovereignty. Armenia grants the TDC exclusive rights to land use, development, permitting, and operation for an initial term of 49 years, with the possibility of extension for up to 99 years. While legal sovereignty over the territory formally remains with Armenia, the management and operational control of strategic infrastructure are effectively transferred to entities under predominant foreign influence. For this reason, the analysis characterizes the resulting arrangement as one of “formal sovereignty with operational constraints.”

From a constitutional and legal perspective, the agreement also raises serious concerns. One of its provisions stipulates that, in the event of a conflict with Armenian legislation, the agreement shall prevail. This effectively elevates the agreement above ordinary domestic legislation and limits the ability of future governments and parliaments to amend the legal framework governing TRIPP’s operations. Furthermore, Armenia undertakes to provide special exemptions from existing legislation governing joint-stock companies, public-private partnerships, and public procurement. As a result, the agreement establishes a distinct legal regime that could weaken existing mechanisms for competition, transparency, anti-corruption oversight, and public accountability.

The governance structure established by the agreement likewise contains several uncertainties. It provides that the shareholders’ agreement of the TDC will be governed by the laws of the State of New York, while TDC US will be incorporated in Delaware as a wholly owned subsidiary of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). Consequently, the governance of strategic infrastructure operating on Armenian territory is, in part, placed outside Armenia’s legal and institutional framework. At the same time, several key issues—including voting procedures, veto rights, deadlock resolution mechanisms, and the scope of matters relating to “national security,” “political considerations,” and “reserved matters”—are left to future negotiations. This lack of clarity increases the risk of decision-making processes taking place behind closed doors and beyond effective public oversight.

From an economic standpoint, the agreement also reflects a clear imbalance. Armenia contributes land, strategic transit corridors, infrastructure opportunities, regulatory support, and political responsibility, while the American side’s financial commitments remain undefined. The agreement merely states that the United States intends to support the mobilization of financing, subject to the availability of funds. It establishes no mandatory investment commitments, minimum funding thresholds, or specific implementation timelines. Consequently, Armenia’s obligations are clearly defined and legally binding, whereas substantial uncertainty remains regarding the financing of the project.

The agreement’s fiscal and taxation provisions further reinforce this imbalance. The TDC is granted extensive tax exemptions, including exemptions from taxes on dividends, capital gains, and certain TRIPP-related transactions. This could limit Armenia’s future tax revenues from infrastructure projects implemented on its own territory. At the same time, the agreement contains no binding provisions requiring the use of local labour, the transfer of technology, the participation of Armenian companies, or clear mechanisms for the distribution of economic benefits. As a result, a significant portion of the project’s anticipated economic advantages remains speculative and not guaranteed.

The analysis also places particular emphasis on the absence of environmental governance provisions. The agreement contains no requirements concerning environmental impact assessments, biodiversity protection, the mitigation of ecological risks, land restoration, pollution control, or public environmental oversight. This omission is especially significant given that the project encompasses the development of roads, railways, oil and gas pipelines, energy infrastructure, and fibre-optic networks. Such projects have the potential to cause land degradation, ecosystem fragmentation, disruption of water resources, and other long-term environmental consequences, yet the agreement establishes no mandatory mechanisms to prevent or mitigate these risks.

The agreement also raises security concerns regarding border management. It provides for the involvement of private operators at border crossings to perform certain customer service functions. Although Armenia retains its customs, border security, and law enforcement authorities, the participation of private actors may raise concerns about accountability, data protection, information security, and the effectiveness of oversight. Additional risks may emerge in digital interoperability, cybersecurity, and access to strategically sensitive data.

Furthermore, the agreement links Armenia’s long-term commitments to several external political developments. The success of the project depends on the normalization of Armenia–Azerbaijan and Armenia–Turkey relations, continued engagement by the United States, and the preservation of regional cooperation. Armenia, therefore, assumes long-term obligations, while a substantial portion of the anticipated benefits depends on political factors that lie beyond its direct control.

Finally, the agreement’s dispute resolution framework remains weak and incomplete. It does not provide for international arbitration, independent judicial bodies, or binding enforcement mechanisms. In the event of a dispute, the parties are limited to general consultations and cooperative dialogue. This is particularly problematic given the scale, duration, and political sensitivity of the project.

Overall, the TRIPP Framework Agreement establishes a new geopolitical, economic, and governance architecture under which Armenia assumes significant sovereign, political, and economic obligations, while many of the expected benefits remain only partially guaranteed. The long-term viability and balance of the agreement will depend on the introduction of additional safeguards, including stronger constitutional oversight, enhanced parliamentary and public accountability, clearer investment and economic commitments, the incorporation of environmental protection mechanisms, additional national security guarantees, and the establishment of a more effective dispute resolution system. Without such protective measures, the agreement risks evolving not into a framework for equal and mutually beneficial cooperation, but rather into a source of long-term structural dependence and strategic vulnerability for Armenia.