The third roundtable of the Diaspora Mobilization Conference focused on the current state and future of Armenia–Diaspora relations.

Participants examined the political, institutional and strategic challenges affecting these relations, the role of the Diaspora in advancing Armenian national interests, and the need for stronger mechanisms of cooperation. Particular attention was given to Artsakh, national security, political advocacy, and the protection of Armenian rights and cultural heritage.

The discussion also considered international models of homeland–Diaspora cooperation and the lessons they may offer for strengthening Armenia–Diaspora relations.

The entire course of world history has been a struggle to expand influence. In that struggle, we have adopted a defensive posture, whereas we must also become active participants in the competition—economically, scientifically, and in other fields—while ensuring the comprehensive development of our people and our state.

We are a remarkable nation. We have endured immense hardships and still succeeded in establishing a state; we have not disappeared. We must also take pride in our past, for it can inspire and motivate our younger generations.

The existence of our Diaspora provides us with a tremendous advantage in this global competition. Through its extensive network, the Diaspora can accomplish things that the Republic of Armenia cannot achieve on its own.

We must not become discouraged by our present setbacks. Defeats are temporary; they will be followed by victories if we know where we are headed.

One must continue to struggle and move forward to survive. Otherwise, others will not allow you to develop. It may seem that the notion of competition among nations is outdated because global movements sometimes appear to obscure that reality. Yet fierce competition, though often disguised, continues unabated.

Artsakh and Armenian National Priorities

The issue of Artsakh remains the most critical one. It is the key link that must be grasped correctly if we are to pull the entire chain in the right direction. The depopulation of Artsakh is a recent tragedy. Even if states, acting out of their own interests, oppose the return of the Armenians of Artsakh, they nevertheless cannot publicly declare such a position or deny support for the principle of the right of return itself.

Unfortunately, the full potential of the Diaspora has not yet been fully utilized. Many continue to measure the Diaspora’s support primarily in financial terms, which is why some dismissively refer to it as a “cash cow.”

Although the dual citizenship law was adopted in 1997, the Government of Armenia did not actively encourage members of the Diaspora to become citizens of the Republic of Armenia.

The abolition of the Ministry of Diaspora and its replacement with the Office of the High Commissioner was a misguided decision, as it dismantled the traditional Armenia–Diaspora relationship. Established Armenian organizations were replaced by individuals closely aligned with the government.

At the 2024 Armenia–Diaspora Conference, Prime Minister Pashinyan declared, “We do not need your humanitarian assistance,” a statement that was deeply offensive to the Diaspora.

Pashinyan’s policies, particularly toward Diaspora organizations, as well as the direction of his domestic agenda, have become a serious obstacle to healthy Armenia–Diaspora relations.

The importance of preserving Armenia–Diaspora relations lies in fostering the development of human capital and professional expertise. The abolition of the Ministry of Diaspora sent a clear signal aimed at weakening that relationship. It is evident that one of the objectives of the current Armenian government is to sever these ties. What remains unclear is whether this policy is being imposed by external powers.

Another major concern is the proposed constitutional amendments, specifically the removal of references to the Declaration of Independence and to the principle of Nagorno-Karabakh’s right to self-determination.

Armenia’s Foreign Relations and National Security

We must pursue policies that give priority to maintaining good relations with all of Armenia’s neighboring countries. However, this does not mean accepting Russia’s silence regarding the incursions into Armenia’s sovereign borders, nor does it mean supporting forces that do not even know “who the Armenians are and what they represent.”

Neither the United States, nor the European Union, nor Russia is genuinely concerned with Armenia’s interests. Armenia’s national security strategy must begin with the recognition of this reality.

Our role, often carried out quietly, is to advance the political interests of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

We have several political objectives, some of which are already being actively pursued:

1. Initiating legal proceedings in Switzerland against SOCAR Trading SA for failing to comply with OECD Guidelines, on the grounds that its parent company, SOCAR, financed Azerbaijan’s 2020 war effort and military procurement.
2. Defending the right of return of the people forcibly displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh.
3. Securing the release of Armenians who are being unlawfully detained in Baku.
4. Protecting the Armenian cultural heritage of Nagorno-Karabakh.
5. Addressing the seizure and destruction of Armenian homes and property, including in Stepanakert.
6. Ending Azerbaijan’s occupation of 240 square kilometers of the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia.

Therefore, we must present these arguments in a compelling and persuasive manner before international organizations, first and foremost the United Nations, as well as national governments.

We must also dispel the narrative, both domestically and internationally, that raising these issues will inevitably lead to war with Azerbaijan.

All of this can be done without resorting to populist accusations against Armenia’s current government, which only fuel the already existing climate of hate speech.

We must offer our allies well-conceived and credible initiatives, not by presenting ourselves as nationalist forces, but as a movement genuinely committed to the protection of minority rights. We should provide financial support to organizations working in this direction, and we should also support media outlets, even those outside our own political circles, that independently carry out this work.

Consider this: Why has Armenia never established an independent public opinion polling institute? Would it not be better to have a clearer understanding of what is taking place?

Governments come and go, but international law endures.

Rethinking Armenia–Diaspora Relations

Armenia represents a unique case in Diaspora studies. As Diaspora scholar Khachig Tölölyan has argued, Armenia is not merely a nation-state in the conventional sense but a “transnation”—a nation whose majority lives outside its borders. This reality requires a distinct model of governance.

As a result of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s administration, Armenia–Diaspora relations have deteriorated in three principal areas: institutional, ideological, and strategic.

Within the institutional sphere, this deterioration is reflected in the abolition of the Ministry of Diaspora, the marginalization of Diaspora affairs, the discontinuation of pan-Armenian conferences, and the sharp decline in joint constructive initiatives.

Within the ideological sphere, it is reflected in the redefinition of Armenian national identity and its implications for the Diaspora; the concept of “Real Armenia” as opposed to “Historical Armenia”; the rewriting of history textbooks; and the deterioration of Church–State relations.

Within the strategic sphere, it is reflected in the loss of Artsakh, the collapse of Diaspora confidence, the ethnic cleansing of Artsakh, and the abandonment of the Armenian Genocide agenda.

The main reasons for the failure of Armenia’s Diaspora policy include the divergence between the state’s political vision and that of the Diaspora, mutual distrust, the absence of an appropriate institutional framework governing Armenia–Diaspora relations, and other related factors.

Because of the Armenian Genocide, Armenian communities were established in many different countries. When Armenians later emigrated from those countries, they carried with them elements of the local cultures they had adopted. This was further supplemented by emigrants from Armenia itself, giving rise to new Diaspora communities. Today, we have highly diverse and heterogeneous Armenian Diasporas.

Lebanon is a prime example of this phenomenon. Within the Diaspora, unity is often essential for survival, while foreign powers may seek to exploit divisions within Armenian communities for their own benefit.

The challenges in Armenia–Diaspora relations are not new. However, under the current administration, all previous limits have been crossed. It is evident that dissatisfaction with the Diaspora did not begin only recently, although it has become far more pronounced today.

After the Armenian Genocide, when the League of Nations was considering where to resettle displaced Armenians, Turkey actively worked to prevent Armenians from settling along its borders—in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—and instead sought to direct them to places such as Cyprus and Madagascar. What Turkey failed to accomplish then, did it not attempt to achieve during the Lebanese Civil War by weakening the Armenian Diaspora and making its survival more difficult?

Today, Armenia’s current authorities view the Diaspora as a burden, much as they have viewed Artsakh.

Nevertheless, we must remain committed to Armenian statehood and, following a change in government, dedicate ourselves to restoring what has been lost.

Recently, a growing view has emerged that the Armenian communities of the Middle East should become merely cultural entities. However, we must not overlook the fact that Armenians in the Middle East also possess political rights and political representation.

Reducing these communities to purely cultural institutions would amount to political suicide. The Armenian communities of the Middle East can and should continue their struggle for the unity of Armenia and the Diaspora.

Dreams cannot have an expiration date; they are eternal. We cannot compromise on our fundamental national objectives. Temporary priorities may be established from time to time, but the struggle for a Free, Independent, and United Armenia must continue.

International Models of Homeland–Diaspora Cooperation

Israel

What has Israel done?

• Enacted the Law of Return, organizing large-scale and systematic repatriation.
• Established a strong global institution, the Jewish Agency for Israel.
• Developed targeted programs, such as Birthright Israel, which brings young Jews to Israel.

Results

• Large-scale immigration and inflows of capital.
• A powerful global lobbying network.
• Strong support for the country’s defense during times of crisis.

Israel places great importance on repatriation and on preserving and strengthening Jewish identity. The Diaspora is regarded as an integral part of the state, not as an “external community.”

Ireland

What has Ireland done?

• Created a global network of Irish communities.
• Actively engaged the Diaspora in the country’s investment initiatives.
• Launched programs such as the Global Irish Network.

Results

• Attracted international companies to invest in the Irish economy.
• Became one of Europe’s leading technology hubs.

The Diaspora helped revive the country’s economy and build a global network.

India

What has India done?

• Provides support for Indian professionals living abroad. Overseas Indians benefit from special legal statuses such as OCI (Overseas Citizen of India) and PIO (Person of Indian Origin).
• Established close ties with the Indian IT Diaspora, particularly in Silicon Valley.
• Implemented repatriation and cooperation programs.
• Organizes the annual Pravasi Bharatiya Divas convention.

Results

• Rapid development of the information technology sector.
• An influx of expertise, knowledge, and investment.

The Diaspora serves as a technological bridge for the country.

China

What has China done?

• Established the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office.
• Actively encouraged entrepreneurs to return.
• Created favorable conditions for investment from the Diaspora.
• Utilized the Diaspora to expand into international markets.

Results

• Rapid industrial development.
• Global business expansion.

The Diaspora is viewed as an economic resource and an engine for national development.

Turkey

What has Turkey done?

• Established the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB).
• Provides state support for Turkish schools and cultural centers abroad.

Results

• Through the integration of cultural and political initiatives, it has successfully organized and mobilized its Diaspora politically.

France

What has France done?

• Established the Assembly of French Citizens Abroad as a representative institution for the French Diaspora.
• French citizens living abroad have the right both to vote and to run for public office.

Results

• Institutionalized the political participation of French citizens residing abroad.

Practical Recommendations

1. The Armenian Diaspora should adopt a Declaration on the Rights of Artsakh, including the preparation of a roadmap for protecting those rights.
2. Establish a Pan-Diasporan Armenian Parliament, elected by Diaspora Armenians, to serve as the representative body of the Armenian Diaspora.